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 Non-technical summary 
This empirical analysis addresses the attractiveness of European financial centers. The 
presented research tackles an issue that is fundamental to the understanding of organizational 
behavior in finance – the rationale in the decision-making process of market participants and 
its consequences for an economy. The results provide a unique insight into market 
participants’ views on factors that affect the locational attractiveness of a financial center over 
time, taking into account assessments before, during, and after the financial crisis. This 
analysis of market participants’ views is carried out by explaining their assessment of 
financial centers‘ attractiveness with their assessment of central influencing factors.  
In particular, the results reveal that cluster concentration with a speedy information 
exchange within dense social networks is a competitive advantage. In comparison, an existing 
specialized pool of labor without concentration seems not to be relevant, as the human capital 
factor is relatively mobile in an increasingly integrated Europe. Furthermore, governmental 
support and parameters of regulation strongly determine a location’s attractiveness for 
financial institutions, whereas the level of taxation seems not to be important on the micro 
level. Despite some progress in establishing a level playing field in the EU, the financial 
market is not yet fully harmonized and countries can take different paths in regulation as long 
as there is scope for interpretation. Hence, even minor differences in financial regulation 
within the EU may lead to regulatory arbitrage. Overall, financial centers’ attractiveness 
varies over time, in comparison to relatively persistent location factors. The findings do not 
hinge on differences in market participants’ socio-economic background. It is shown that fund 
companies seem to value the attractiveness of a financial center much more than banks, 
insurance companies, and corporates. 
  
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Diese empirische Forschungsarbeit untersucht die Attraktivität von europäischen 
Finanzzentren. Damit soll diese Arbeit zu einem weiteren Verständnis des 
Organisationsverhaltens von Finanzintermediären beitragen. Es werden Erkenntnisse zum 
Entscheidungsprozess von Marktakteuren gewonnen, die gesamtwirtschaftliche Folgen für 
eine Volkswirtschaft haben. Die Ergebnisse bieten einen Einblick in die Ansichten von 
Marktteilnehmern zu Faktoren, die die standortbezogene Attraktivität eines Finanzzentrums 
über die Zeit beeinflussen können. Dabei werden die Einschätzungen vor, während und nach 
der Finanzkrise berücksichtigt. Die Beurteilung der Attraktivität wird durch Einschätzungen 
zu zentralen Einflussfaktoren erklärt.  
Insbesondere zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die Konzentration im Cluster mit einem 
schnellen Informationsaustausch in dichten sozialen Netzwerken einen Wettbewerbsvorteil 
darstellt. Im Vergleich scheint ein vorhandener Pool an spezialisierten Arbeitskräften, die 
nicht konzentriert vorhanden sind, irrrelevant zu sein, da der Produktionsfaktor Arbeit als 
relativ mobil in einem zunehmend integrierten Europa angesehen wird. Darüber hinaus hat 
das Ausmaß staatlicher Unterstützung und die Regulierungsintensität einen starken Einfluss 
auf die Attraktivitätswahrnehmung, wobei das Besteuerungsniveau auf der Mikroebene 
hierfür nicht bedeutend ist. Trotz Fortschritten in der Schaffung gleicher 
Wettbewerbsbedingungen innerhalb der EU, ist der Finanzmarkt nicht vollständig 
harmonisiert. Interpretationsspielräume können daher in den Mitgliedsländern zu 
regulatorischer Arbitrage führen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen deutlich, dass die Attraktivität eines 
Finanzzentrums, im Vergleich zu relativ persistenten Standortfaktoren, im Laufe der Zeit 
stark variiert. Die Resultate hängen auch nicht vom sozioökonomischen Hintergrund der 
Marktteilnehmer ab. Marktteilnehmer einer Fondsgesellschaft messen allerdings der 
Finanzplatzattraktivität eine vergleichsweise stärkere Bedeutung zu. 
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1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis of the late 2000s demonstrated the inadequacy of the 
regulatory framework in safeguarding the financial system’s stability and exerted enormous 
negative effects on the real economy. Financial institutions collapsed or were bought out; on a 
national level, governments were forced to respond rapidly with rescue packages in order to 
bail out their banking sector. Interestingly, a large fraction of the activities involving so-called 
“toxic assets,” which essentially caused the crisis, were created by financial companies in 
financial centers, where, despite the spatial proximity of financial counterparties, concerns 
about counterparty credit risks spread quickly. In addition, there were significant amounts of 
job lay-offs in these centers. Financial centers are considered agglomerated bundles of the 
institutions responsible for capital and risk allocation of an economy, such as stock exchanges, 
banks, insurance and investment fund companies, or other service companies, such as 
consulting firms or software companies. A financial center can be defined as a nexus of ties 
between companies and institutions in a geographically defined area, which are involved in 
functions that enable and facilitate financial transactions (Lang, 2012: 31-32). 
The rise and fall of major financial centers and their attractiveness per se are a topic of 
long-standing interest. They do not emerge out of nowhere or overnight. The financial industry 
has always been concentrated in a few cities whose respective significance has waxed and 
waned over time. Today, the earliest European capitals of money, such as Antwerps, 
Augsburg, Bruges, or Florence are of no more than local relevance, if any at all. Cities such as 
Paris or London have continued to be of great significance, and locations such as 
Luxembourg, Zurich, and Frankfurt have gained importance for the financial industry (e.g., 
Cassis, 2006). Interest in financial centers has been spurred on by the rise of new counterparts, 
such as the Asian former regional centers of Hong Kong, Seoul, Shanghai, and Singapore, to 
the preeminent European hubs, as well as new financial centers in the Arab world (e.g., Qatar) 
seeking to establish an international presence.  
Governments have reason to attract financial institutions and facilitate cross-border 
activities as these typically offer advantages to their host cities and countries, including higher 
paying jobs and increased personal income, wealth, and tax revenues. Several transmission 
channels allow further benefits due to the relationship of banking and the economy (e.g., Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998; Aghion et al., 2005 and 2009). Consequently, financial centers find 
themselves competing with each other, and each country tries to enhance its home markets’ 
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attractiveness. Today, although several steps to establish a level playing field have been taken 
in Europe, the European financial market is not yet fully harmonized. Countries can take 
different paths when implementing key (regulation) issues, which may lead to a different 
quality of the business environment and thus to competition especially in cross-border banking 
activity (up to regulation arbitrage). For instance, corresponding critics outside the euro zone 
fear that EU regulation is designed to undermine their position and favor financial centers in 
mainland Europe. This includes efforts by the European Central Bank to force clearing houses 
that settle trades in Euros to locate in the euro zone (The Economist, 2011). The front-page 
story of The Economist (2012) in early 2012 reveals conceivable implications of stronger 
regulation and a possible new EU legislation for the British financial center. In the course of 
changes in regulation, higher taxes and public hostility, banking units have moved abroad or 
are on the verge of relocating, such as commodity traders and hedge funds to Switzerland. 
This paper analyzes the attractiveness of major European financial centers, the influence 
of location factors on the quality of the microeconomic business environment and their impact 
on the attractiveness over time. The relevance of changes in location factors have thus far only 
been subject to speculation, but have never been measured empirically. The results provide a 
unique insight into experts’ judgment of the European financial centers and decisive location 
factors before, during, and after the financial crisis. This paper provides new evidence about 
market participants’ assessments, thus delving into the “decision rule” governing the 
operations of financial institutions. 
The results show that the decisive part of the comparative advantage in a financial center 
lies outside the company and even outside its industry. The speedy information exchange 
within dense social networks increases attractiveness. In comparison, an existing specialized 
pool of labor without concentration seems not to be relevant, as the human capital factor is 
relatively mobile in an increasingly integrated Europe. Furthermore, the empirical evidence 
shows that the assessment of a financial center’s attractiveness varies significantly over time. 
Nevertheless, the results also indicate that the decisive location factors are persistent over 
time. The attractiveness of the benchmark country Germany was higher at the peak of the 
financial crisis (it was acting as a safe haven in the European financial market), but lower after 
than before the financial crisis. However, the domestic sales market is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition for attractiveness. Support by the government strongly increases 
attractiveness. Consequently, the regulatory framework is an additional crucial determinant. 
On the other hand, the level of tax burden seems to be less important in competition between 
business locations. The results emphasize that in contrast to the location factors, the socio-
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economic background of the actors (age, work experience, education, and location) is 
negligible, and the empirical findings cannot confirm differences in individual behavior. 
Nevertheless, the probability of reporting an increase in attractiveness is lower for market 
participants from fund companies, who tend to be more pessimistic about the attractiveness of 
a financial center than actors from other sectors. Interestingly, their impact is the strongest 
among all considered determinants. Thus, investment fund companies seem to value the 
attractiveness of a financial center much more than banks, insurance companies, and 
corporates.  
The empirical approach is based on an ordered probit model. In order to compare 
experts’ assessments about the relevance of location factors, around 300 market participants in 
the German financial sector were asked in four consecutive years, giving us a total number of 
730 observations. The first survey was conducted at the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008, 
immediately preceding the collapse of Bears Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the dramatic 
quantitative easing measures of the major central banks worldwide. The second and third 
surveys were conducted in early 2009 and 2010. The latest survey dates back to the beginning 
of 2011.  
Economists have long been concerned with the way companies are restricted by the 
external environment (e.g., Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985; Kogut and Zander, 1996). 
Simultaneously, a specific strand of research theory addresses the particular analysis of 
companies’ agglomeration (e.g., Kaldor, 1972; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Krugman, 1991; 
Venables, 1996; Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000). Since the work of Reed (1981), many studies have 
been devoted to classifying financial centers and organizing them into a hierarchy (e.g., Poon 
et al., 2004). These studies often base their analysis on a set of quantitative characteristics, 
such as the number of foreign banks or market capitalization. However, that sort of approach 
has its limits. Although it allows for the comparison of a large number of financial centers, it 
fails to identify the particularly critical factors over time. Other studies are based on a detailed 
description of historical developments, findings through interviews and surveys (e.g., 
Abraham et al., 1994; Dietl et al., 1999, Bindemann, 1999; Harrschar-Ehrnborg, 2002; 
Financial Center Initiative, 2003; Cassis, 2006; Geiger and Kappel, 2006; Lannoo, 2007). 
Sometimes they expose detailed comparisons between financial centers in Europe and the 
optimal design of an international financial center. However, many surveys are conducted in 
small groups of participants and usually each group only participates once. Hence, it is unclear 
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whether their findings are robust over time.2 Therefore, this study seeks to close this research 
gap. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the structure of the survey 
approach and the characteristics of the participating financial experts will be explained. To 
become familiar with the principal characteristics of the data a detailed descriptive impression 
on the findings will be given in Chapter 3. Afterwards in Chapter 4, an in-depth analysis of the 
results with a pooled ordered probit model will be provided. By calculating the marginal 
effects, it is possible to further measure the elements that might lead to attractiveness within 
the different assessment levels. Chapter 5 concludes. 
 
2 Empirical Setting and Data 
This section presents the analysis of the data set. Therefore, in a first step the structure of 
the survey approach and the characteristics of the participating financial experts will be 
explained. The dataset consists of four surveys that were jointly conducted with the “ZEW 
Financial Market Survey,” which includes the internationally regarded German “ZEW 
indicator of economic sentiment.” It has been provided on a monthly basis since December 
1991. About 350 financial analysts from banks, insurance and fund companies as well as 
industrial companies regularly participate in the survey the index is based on.3  
For this work an additional questionnaire was developed and attached four times to the 
ZEW index. The first special survey for the purpose of this work was conducted at the turn of 
the year 2007/08, between December 8 and January 9, immediately before the collapse of Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the dramatic quantitative easing measures of major central 
banks.4 Since then, the survey has been conducted annually, every January, until 2011. The 
survey provides an unbalanced panel dataset with 730 observations. Taking into account the 
individual years, 126 respondents have answered at the turn of the year 2007/08, 228 in 2009, 
135 in 2010 and 241 in 2011.  
                                                 
2 The amount of literature which applies economic geography approaches on finance and banking in terms of 
their locations has also grown over the last two decades (e.g., Dow, 1990; Corbridge et al. 1994; Porteous, 1995; 
Thrift and Leyshon, 1997; Cohen, 1998; Laulajainen, 1998; Martin, 1999; Klagge and Martin, 2005; Clark, 2006; 
Gärtner, 2009; Capelle-Blancard and Tadjeddine, 2010; see Martin, 2011). 
3 Among the respondents are financial experts from research, economic and finance departments, fund managers 
and investment consultants (e.g., Schmidt and Nautz, 2012: 4-5). 
4 As it is important to formulate appropriate questions in a survey, the questionnaire design was aligned with the 
guidelines of Groves et al. (2009), Schaeffer et al. (2003), and Bradburn et al. (2004).  
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Figure 1 provides an overview of the chronological order of the surveys. The vertical 
solid lines display the points in time at which a survey was conducted. The historical sequel of 
some crucial events during the financial crisis is displayed by vertical dashed lines. Moreover, 
different performance stock indices (Dax30 and MSCI Europe) and central bank interest rates 
(ECB and FED) are considered as simple indicators for market sentiment. It is assumed that 
the participants in the sample were aware of these previous events and levels of financial 
indicators at the time of each survey. The first survey at the turn of the year 2007/08 is defined 
as “before,” the second survey in 2009 as “during” and the third and fourth surveys in 2010 
and 2011 as “after” the financial crisis. 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
The questionnaire was then used in a pre-test with market experts as a final check of its 
acceptance and appropriateness. The questionnaire, which was used for each survey from 2008 
to 2011, consists of eight questions that aim at evaluating the attractiveness of financial centers 
and relevant location factors in theory and practice. The participants first gave a detailed, 
exemplary assessment of Germany, their domestic market, before they evaluated the aggregate 
fulfillment of location factors in the most important competing countries with hubs in Europe, 
which are France, Germany, Great Britain, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. The selected group 
of countries was chosen because it includes countries with different characteristics.5  
All questions were to be answered on an ordinal scale with three to five ordered grades 
and the additional option to add further aspects missing from the questionnaire.6 The used 
scale format follows the Likert bipolar scaling method that measures either positive or 
negative assessments to a statement.  
Table 1 summarizes different location factors with their sub-criteria. Location factors 
can be determined and sorted by groups, which might be of particular relevance for the 
attractiveness of a financial center from the theoretical and empirical point of view. The 
development and interaction of these factors, influenced by changes in other countries, should 
explain the ups and downs in attractiveness.  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
                                                 
5 Roughly, one can say that Great Britain is attractive for financial activities related to the capital market, 
Luxembourg is famous for the concentration of its asset management industry (with a small domestic market 
size), and Switzerland is well-known for its private banking, asset management activities as well as banking 
secrecy. Germany's financial industry is highly intertwined with the industry sector, and similar to France, also 
known for its large domestic market size in Europe. 
6 The ordinal scale provides sufficient details while not overstraining the respondents (Groves, 2009). 
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In addition to this first questionnaire, a second separate questionnaire was sent out once, 
in which survey participants were asked to give information on personal characteristics. At 
least 612 of 730 observations in total provided their personal data. Consequently, socio-
economic characteristics data on 84 percent of the sample is available. Hence, it is possible to 
draw conclusions about how different personal characteristics influence market participants’ 
assessment and whether the financial crisis affected individuals differently. An overview 
considering this socio-economic information is given in Table 2. 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
3 Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 2 gives a basic overview on the respondents’ assessment of Germany as a 
financial center. Before the financial crisis, only 43 percent of participants considered 
Germany attractive or very attractive; the lion’s share, with 45 percent, was merely neutral. 
Interestingly, in the year of the crisis in 2009 the image turned and 57 percent of the experts 
assessed the financial center as attractive or even very attractive. At the same time, the 
proportion of negative assessments dropped, so that about 36 percent gave a neutral opinion. 
The results of the 2010 survey do not differ much. However, the proportion of negative 
assessments increases somewhat. This trend continues in 2011, and the results are rather 
similar to the time before the financial crisis. Yet, a share of 41.2 percent continues to rate 
Germany as attractive or very attractive, accompanied with a peak on the negative side, as 17 
percent of participants consider Germany (very) unattractive.  
[insert Figure 2 about here] 
The second question of the survey provides a picture of how the other European 
financial centers in focus are ranked. The results indicate a trend similar to the previous 
assessments of Germany. As can be seen in Figure 3, the share of negative estimates is the 
lowest in the crisis year of 2009. The same picture is given for France, also characterized by a 
large domestic market size; however, in general, the participants give France a more 
pessimistic outlook than the other countries. More than half of all respondents assess the 
environment in France as (very) unattractive, even after the crisis, in 2011, with a proportion 
of 86 percent. As such, both countries were deemed by the surveyed experts to have benefited 
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from the crisis. In case of an incipient improvement in market conditions, they would however 
suffer from a loss in popularity which would return them to pre-crisis circumstances. 
A contrasting development is given for Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. Before (2008) and after the crisis (2011), they were rated at their best levels. Hence, 
the worst-ranking countries France and Germany seem to be the winners of the crisis at the 
expense of the other three. Both countries’ means went up in 2009 but subsequently fell again 
when the financial market began to recover from the crisis. It is evident that standard 
deviations increased in in the crisis for all countries, especially for France and the UK. 
[insert Figure 3 about here] 
Moreover, the participants have been asked, on the one hand, about the relevance of 
specific location factors from a theoretical point of view for an ideal financial center (depicted 
on the left-hand side of Figure 4) and, on the other hand, about the real levels for the 
benchmark financial center (depicted in Figure 4 on the right side). This comparison shows the 
difference between need and reality over time. At first glance, it is apparent that all factors 
have been assessed as important from a theoretical point of view. In particular, political and 
legal stability seem to play the most important role, while economic stability as well as 
supervisory and regulatory framework conditions are also rated high. These three factors also 
exhibit relatively low standard deviations, indicating a large consensus among the respondents. 
In contrast, most disagreement is observed for the relevance of soft factors and market 
potential, which are regarded as sufficient for the growth of a financial center. For the 
complete observed period, the cluster concentration of important market participants as well as 
the availability of human capital were both also rated important (greater than 1). Both factors 
have exhibited similar magnitude. The average results regarding location factor development 
indicate that location factors are relatively persistent over time. These results can be affiliated 
to a steady mindset during times of crisis. Yet, interesting differences can be identified. 
Average values for cost-related factors (taxation) and innovation potential dropped during the 
crisis and increased again afterwards. A different course can be observed for other factors. For 
instance, the need for legal and financial stability becomes more important during the crisis, as 
does the need for the concentration of other important market participants and soft factors in 
the cluster. 
The levels of realization show a different picture for the benchmark financial center. 
Comparisons of the means indicate that all factors are seen in a worse light, whereas the 
results for soft factors at least distinguish between theory and practice. In particular, it appears 
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that the fiscal and regulatory frameworks in Germany differ the most from the theoretical need 
during the entire time period. In comparison, the assessments regarding the supervisory and 
regulatory framework have been interpreted as slightly lacking. However, the experts’ 
assessments improve for both the crisis year and the subsequent year. The opinion also holds 
true for both human capital cluster factors. The realizations are relatively close to and 
consistent with theory on stability indicators regarding the political, economic and market 
environment. These results may reflect the broadly established financial industry in Germany 
and its relatively small proportion of the German value added.7 
[insert Figure 4 about here] 
  
4 Econometric Analysis 
4.1 Econometric Model and Testing 
In the next step, an econometric model provides an in-depth-analysis of the results. 
Financial experts have been asked about their view on the attractiveness of financial centers 
and the possible driving location factors for business activity. The objective is to model the 
assessment of financial centers‘ attractiveness as a function of the assessment of central 
influencing factors, such as regulatory and tax attractiveness, market concentration, 
governmental efforts, and so on. The empirical analysis is based on a pooled ordered probit 
model to account for the ordered outcomes of the dependent variable (categorical variable with 
five possible outcomes).  
Multinomial logit or probit analyses would fail to account for the ordinal nature of the 
dependent variables. Ordinary regression techniques would err in the opposite direction, 
because they do not recognize the information content of one grade difference, i.e., estimation 
may vary along the used Likert scale. For example, the linear regression model would treat the 
difference between 1 and 2 in the same way as the difference between 2 and 3, whereas in fact 
the ordinal difference might be greater or smaller. Therefore, an ordered probit model is 
                                                 
7 For further results of this analysis, see Lang (2012): Basically, the surveyed experts assess government efforts 
in Germany on a five-step scale of school grades between “one” (i.e., A=excellent) and “five” (i.e., F=fail) with 
poor grades (see Figure 5). Exactly 50 percent of respondents assessed government efforts with the grades “four” 
or “five” (D or F) before the crisis. 
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estimated, as initially proposed by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975), which is able to account for 
the ordered differences among the response categories (see Greene, 2012).  
 
Formally, the latent regression of the ordered probit model is specified as follows: 
 
itY
∗ = iα + β
′
itX + εit 
 
The following categories are then assigned to the unknown Y ∗ :  
 
itY = 1, if itY
∗ ≤ 1z ,  
itY = 2,  if 1z < itY
∗  ≤ 2z , 
itY = 3,  if 2z < itY
∗  ≤ 3z , 
itY = 4,  if 3z < itY
∗  ≤ 4z , 
itY = 5,  if 4z  ≤ itY
∗ .       
 
where z is an unknown threshold that defines, which values of Y ∗ correspond to the observable 
outcome Y . The thresholds 1z  to 4z  themselves are unknown and will be estimated along 
with the parameters β and α. X is a matrix of the independent variables for each individual i, 
αi is the constant term, and ε a normally distributed error term. The underlying assumption is 
that the five respondent categories are ordered from the lowest to the highest level and that the 
threshold levels are positively increasing as 0 < 1z  < 2z < ⋯ < 5z .  
 
Taking this into account, the probability function of itY  has the following form: 
 
Prob( itY = 1) = Prob( itY
∗ ≤ 1z ) = Φ(− β
′
itx ), 
Prob( itY = 2) = Prob( 1z < itY
∗  ≤ 2z ) = Φ( 2z − β
′
itx ) − Φ(− β
′
itx ), 
Prob( itY = 3) = Prob( 2z < itY
∗  ≤ 3z ) = Φ( 3z − β
′
itx ) − Φ( 2z − β
′
itx ), 
Prob( itY = 4) = Prob( 3z < itY
∗  ≤ 4z ) = Φ( 4z − β
′
itx ) − Φ( 3z − β
′
itx ), 
Prob( itY = 5) = Prob( 4z  ≤ itY
∗ ) = 1 − Φ( 5z − β
′
itx ). 
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where Φ represents the standard normal cumulative distribution. Furthermore, the 
marginal effects are estimated to assess the effects of changes in the covariates on the response 
probabilities. The marginal effects from every independent variable, evaluated at their means, 
are calculated as follows: 
 
( )1it
it
Prob Y
x
∂ =
∂
 = − φ (− itxβ
′ ⋅ ) ⋅ β  
( )2it
it
Prob Y
x
∂ =
∂
 = [φ (− itxβ
′ ⋅ ) − φ ( 2z − itxβ
′ ⋅ )] ⋅ β  
( )3it
it
Prob Y
x
∂ =
∂
 = [φ ( 2z − itxβ
′ ⋅ ) − φ ( 3z − itxβ
′ ⋅ )] ⋅ β  
( )4it
it
Prob Y
x
∂ =
∂
 = [φ ( 3z − itxβ
′ ⋅ ) − φ ( 4z − itxβ
′ ⋅ )] ⋅ β  
( )5it
it
Prob Y
x
∂ =
∂
 = φ ( 5z  − itxβ
′ ⋅ ) ⋅ β   
 
with φ  being the standard normal density. Based on the theoretical specifications 
described above, the following model is estimated by ordered probit: 
 
Yit = 0b + 1b MARKETit + 2b CONCENTRATIONit + 3b TAXit + 4b HUMANCAPITALit + 5b
REGULATIONit + 6b STABPOLit + 7b STABECONit + 8b INNOVATIONit + 9b SOFTFACTSit + 10b
GOVCit + 11b GOVYit + 12b AGEit + 13b JOBEXit + 14b FINEXit + 15b UNIit + 16b FINCENTERit+ 17b
FUNDCOMPANY+ 18b INSURANCEit+ 19b CORPORATEit+ 20b YEAR2009it+ 21b YEAR2010it+ 22b
YEAR2011it + εit 
where  
 
i = 1,…, Nt, represents each individual respondent,  
t = 1,…, T, represents the time period,  
εit = represents the individual-specific and time-specific, normally distributed error term. 
 
Y is the ordered, observed dependent variable that represents the overall attractiveness 
of a country as a financial center as reported by the financial experts. To determine the 
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relevance of the location factors, the German respondents ought to be most familiar with the 
domestic characteristics. Y is the result of the experts’ answers to the first question. The 
answer categories range from 1 to 5, where 1 means very unattractive and 5 means very 
attractive. The greater the value for Y, the higher the rating assessment of Germany as a 
financial center becomes. The independent variables are composed of three parts and are 
summarized in Table 3. 
[insert Table 3 about here] 
Dummy variables are used to determine the progress of assessments and the impact of 
the financial crisis. Note that the benchmark is the level before the crisis (YEAR 2008). The 
work tests whether the assessments after the crisis match the pre-crisis level, or whether a 
fundamentally different view has been formed (YEAR 2010 and YEAR 2011). The findings in 
the descriptive results suggest an increase in attractiveness during the financial crisis and thus 
a positive sign of the coefficients of the dummy variables, due to diversification advantages in 
the economy. 
Question two of the survey deals with the influence of specific location factors on 
overall financial center attractiveness. To estimate this influence, the experts were asked about 
the benchmark’s location factors’ performance in comparison to international competition. 
Answer categories range from levels 1 to 5, where 1 means “much worse” and 5 means “much 
better,” respectively.  
The majority of these independent variables should have a positive impact on Y because, 
from a theoretical point of view, their increase is always accompanied with an increase in 
attractiveness. Therefore, the hypothesis is that the sign of the influence of these factors is 
always positive.  
There are numerous benefits of a cluster8 associated with the proximity to other market 
participants, greater access to information flows, and lower coordination costs. Porter (1998, 
2000) shows that among individuals, geographical and cultural proximity as well as close 
institutional terms lead to advantages in productivity growth and entrepreneurial activity due 
to, e.g., special relationships with better incentives and information that are difficult to tap 
from a distance. The network of companies and public institutions leads to many cluster 
                                                 
8 It is broadly recognized that the observed spatial configuration of economic activities is in general the outcome 
of a process involving two opposing types of forces. These centripetal (agglomeration) and centrifugal 
(dispersion) forces lead to a balance of forces that push and pull consumers and companies (Fujita and Thisse, 
2002: 5). 
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advantages, which have positive externalities or spillover effects across companies and 
industries.  
Dense social networks provide strong reasons for agglomeration, for example clustering 
in the Silicon Valley (i.e., “you can change jobs without changing the parking lots”). Saxenian 
(1994) pointed out that the region was essentially identical to Boston (Route 128) in the 1970s. 
However, the two locations did not have identical characteristics. Offering an entrepreneurial 
culture of rapid changes and quick decisions, the Silicon Valley subsequently transformed into 
a relatively more productive environment.  
Dense clique-like local networks are strengthened over time by shared beliefs and 
perceptions (mental models), e.g., of how markets work, and enable market participants to 
interpret the behavior of others (Baum et al., 2003: 702). Zaheer and Bell (2005) analyze 
syndicate networks of Canadian mutual fund companies and find that cognitive embeddedness 
and the formation of mental models within clique-like interconnected market participants lead 
to persistent network structures. 
Granovetter (2005) gives further evidence that social networks in general affect 
economic outcome, as they (1) improve the flow and quality of information, (2) facilitate 
reward and punishment mechanisms, and (3) foster trust among market participants. Florida 
and Gates (2001) examine the effects of soft location factors, such as cultural diversity. They 
find that clusters with a culture of openness tend to innovate more than less creative cities.  
Since knowledge becomes more specialized over time, a cluster-specific division of 
labor and institutional organization enables the emergence of distinctive approaches to 
learning and knowledge creation (see Bell et al., 2009: 624-625). Corresponding findings 
show that the strength – and not just the existence – of relationships between market 
participants in a cluster is crucial for enabling the exchange of private information and the 
privileged interpretation of market information to result in knowledge spillovers. Formal 
business collaborations enhance socialization and foster an informal relationship between 
market participants (Gulati and Puranam, 2009).  
Finally, the paper exploits the influence of socio-economic factors on the assessments of 
attractiveness. For this purpose the required data about the experts were subsequently 
collected. In particular, age (AGE), level of education (UNI) and the associated professional 
and specific experience in the business world (JOBEX and FINEX) are measured with control 
variables. The literature seems to indicate that experienced as well as older individuals are 
more reluctant to change their beliefs over time (Niessen et al., 2010). For this reason a 
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significantly different response behavior between experienced and inexperienced individuals is 
expected.  
The influence of geographical location is of particular interest to the investigation. 
Individuals inside the financial center may have greater knowledge about comparative 
advantages of financial centers. According to Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), new relationships 
are attracted more strongly by existing close ties and the parties’ partners. This leads to an 
environment of social embedding due to processes of indirect referrals and trust formation. In 
the course of collaboration within the cluster, the interaction between market participants 
through jointly attended (in-) formal events and meetings further shape their mental maps and 
thus their subsequent behavior (i.e., Weick et al., 2005). Therefore, this analysis tests whether 
office location, in or outside the major financial center (FINCENTER), alters the results.  
Thus, it is possible that these experts experienced the crisis differently. If there are 
differences in the assessment of attractiveness due to the industry an expert belongs to, the 
sector dummy variables should be significant. Working for a bank (BANKS) is the 
benchmark. However, the German fund industry is often characterized as a large domestic 
market, whereas the distribution of funds often differs from the domiciliation due to disparities 
in environment conditions (e.g., Luxembourg and Dublin; see Lang and Köhler, 2011). 
Therefore, a negative sign for FUNDCOMPANY is expected. 
4.2 Empirical Results 
The empirical analysis proceeds in several steps. In the first step of the examination the 
paper uses time dummy variables to check whether the assessments of financial experts have 
changed over time. The estimated results are given in Model 1 of Table 4. For deeper insight, 
other factors are considered in the next step, namely the individual reviews of location factors 
and socio-economic background information of the experts. The results of this estimation are 
presented in models 2 to 4 of Table 4. The problem of multicollinearity appears not to exist, 
since the correlation among explanatory variable is not high. The estimation of the same 
models with robust standard errors leads to very similar results and are therefore not reported. 
The results seem to be robust, since the estimates do not vary much across the models. 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
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4.3 Time Effects 
A simple model only taking into account the time dummies is estimated to determine the 
temporal variability of Y (Model 1). This analysis gives evidence that the attractiveness of a 
financial center is time variant. The results in Model 1 indicate that the attractiveness during 
the financial crisis (YEAR 2009) is greater than before and after the crisis. This effect turns 
around, so that after the crisis (YEAR 2011) the coefficient is significant and negative at the 5-
percent level in all models. This means that Germany’s attractiveness was greatest at the peak 
of the financial crisis in 2009. 
4.4 Comparison of Location Factors 
The results of further analysis suggest that several location factors have a direct impact 
on the overall assessment of a financial center. The descriptive analysis in Chapter 3 indicates 
that decisive location factors are relatively stable over time. Can this statement be confirmed 
by econometric analysis? The results confirm the expectations and indicate that strength and 
size of an economy, denoted in the variable MARKET, influence attractiveness. The 
coefficient is positive and significant in both models. Hence, the domestic sales market is at 
least a sufficient condition for the size of a financial center.  
CONCENTRATION is positive and significant on the 1-percent significance level in all 
models. The results confirm the expectations and show that a concentration of important 
market participants in the financial center promotes its overall attractiveness. 
In addition, this work tests whether tax issues (TAX) are relevant for attractiveness. But 
the results show no direct relationship between the structure of the tax system and 
attractiveness. This corresponds to the assessments of interviewees in the pre-test, since they 
particularly pointed out that continuity in taxation is often much more important for their 
businesses than the level of taxation. Changes in the level of taxation increase planning 
uncertainty and provoke cost-intensive process adjustments in each financial institution. 
However, the existing double tax treaty may significantly reduce the influence of different 
system structures.9 
                                                 
9  Brulhart and Jametti (2006) emphasize that either harmonization reduces the tax base, which compels a 
benevolent government to restrict public goods, or competition improves welfare because it constrains big 
governments. Regarding the issue of the corporate tax level, Becker and Fuest (2011) show that the optimal 
tax policy for a government to prevent companies from leaving the country depends on how profitable mobile 
companies are, relatively to immobile companies in a country. Moreover, they show that a tax rate cut cum 
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The also non-significant result on the availability of qualified employees and knowledge 
transfers (HUMANCAPITAL) may have similar reasons. The result implies that the 
attractiveness of a financial center does not directly rely on the local supply of labor. In the 
financial sector companies can recruit the required labor across national borders. This result 
could be motivated by an increasing possibility of labor movement with fewer regulations on 
labor issues, particularly in the EU.  
The results give strong evidence that supervisory and regulatory conditions are relevant 
for the attractiveness of a financial center. This was expected. The variable REGULATION is 
positive and significant at the 5-percent level in the models. This result suggests that small 
regulatory differences, in contrast to tax differences, may lead to more geographical 
consequences, in terms of regulation arbitrage. 
Furthermore, the experts were also consulted on the stability level of the political and 
legal system (STABPOL) and on the stability of the overall economic system (STABECON). 
The latter stands e.g. for price stability and economic development; however, these variables 
are insignificant. The variables are possibly not relevant because these indicators are very 
similar across all countries in focus. The potential for innovation and innovative ability 
(INNOVATION) in terms of new markets (private equity and venture capital, hedge funds) 
have no direct impact on attractiveness. The respective variable is positive but insignificant. 
This might be because, compared to the technical progress, innovations in the area of finance 
have a certainly significantly less “depth,” and can thus not be patented. The development of 
the so-called soft factors (SOFTFACTS), however, has a positive and slightly significant 
effect on the 15-percent level in Model 4. This corresponds to the expectations about its 
impact, such that a pleasant living environment (living quality, language, culture, spare time 
activities) positively influences the attractiveness of a financial center. 
Aspects of the business environment are not always sector-specific but rather cut across 
all industries. Hence, the effects of government initiatives are not necessarily only relevant for 
the financial sector. Varying specific efforts regarding the financial industry, which can be 
distinguished in hard (i.e., regulation) and soft (i.e., marketing) measures, have different 
effects.  
Descriptive results have illustrated that the respondents are very dissatisfied with 
government efforts to create a favorable environment. The variables in the econometric 
                                                                                                                                                         
base broadening policy in a country increases welfare by redistributing the tax burden from mobile to 
immobile companies if the marginal mobile company is more profitable than the average company, and vice 
versa. But in reality governments may not be able to observe a company’s mobility level.  
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analysis regarding the assessments of government efforts are divided into two questions, one 
on the very short-term implementations (GOVC) and one on efforts made in the last two years 
(GOVY). The results of the analysis show that government efforts are considered very 
important for the growth of a cluster. The corresponding coefficients in the models have 
positive signs and are weakly significant (on the 10-percent level) for short-term efforts and 
strongly significant (on the 1-percent level) for the longer term. Nevertheless, the overall 
findings contradict the assumptions in the literature about globalized financial markets with no 
or less and less room for governmental maneuvers (e.g., Sassen, 1999; Porter, 2000). 
4.5 Socio-Economic Background 
In the next step of the analysis, this paper checks whether socio-economic characteristics 
have an impact on the assessment of financial centers’ attractiveness. The results show that in 
contrast to location factors the socio-economic background of the respondents is negligible. 
The horizon of experience does not determine the empirical results, so that differences in the 
characteristics of age (AGE), level of education (UNI) and the associated professional and 
specific experience in the business world (JOBEX and FINEX) are irrelevant. As opposed to 
the general literature (i.e., senior managers would be more reluctant to change their beliefs and 
managers earlier in their careers have less established beliefs; the empirical findings cannot 
confirm differences in behavior. Moreover, experts geographically located in and outside 
financial centers (FINCENTER) do not seem to have different mindsets, either. Working for a 
BANK, INSURANCE or a CORPORATE does not matter at all.  
Interestingly, however, a clear difference can be found for employees of a fund 
company. Fund companies generally judge the attractiveness of the financial center negatively. 
This meets the expectations of a specific view in this specific industry. In all models the 
coefficient for FUNDCOMPANY is negative and strongly significant at the 1-percent level. 
4.6 Overall Fit of the Models 
To test the relative strength of the models, this analysis uses a Likelihood Ratio test (LR 
test) to examine the group-specific heterogeneity in Table 4 (see Greene, 2012). The LR test 
compares the log likelihoods of two models and tests whether this difference is statistically 
significant. If the difference is statistically significant, then the less restrictive model is said to 
fit the data significantly better than the more restrictive model (the one with less variables). 
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The LR test was conducted in a restricted model with the same number of observations (472). 
The LR test shows that the differences between models (4) and (3), (2) or (1) are significant at 
the 1-percent level. According to the values of the log likelihood function and the results of the 
LR tests, the most general model (4) is the preferred one.  
4.7 Marginal Effects 
In the next step, the influence of the variance of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable is analyzed per unit. By calculating the marginal effect, it is possible to 
further determine the elements that might lead to attractiveness within the different assessment 
levels. Table 5 presents the results on the marginal effects. These findings support the previous 
results; the signs of the marginal effects are mostly consistent with the signs of the coefficients 
presented in Table 4. The results of the marginal effects (Table 5) are demonstrated regarding 
the individual questionnaire categories from (1) to (5). Overall, the probability of reporting an 
increase in attractiveness of a financial center (choosing category 4 or 5 – attractive or very 
attractive – in the questionnaire) rises with market size, concentration of important market 
participants, better regulatory framework and greater efforts by the government. On the other 
hand, the probability decreases for respondents from fund companies, who tend to be more 
pessimistic about the attractiveness of a financial center than respondents from other sectors. 
Interestingly, their impact is the strongest among all considered variables. Thus, investment 
fund companies seem to value the attractiveness of a financial center much more than banks, 
insurance companies, and corporates.  
[insert Table 5 about here] 
5 Conclusion 
This paper aims to help explain the puzzle of financial centers’ attractiveness. In order to 
achieve this, the discussion sheds light on the quality of microeconomic business 
environments and their relationship with influencing location factors over time. The results 
provide a unique insight into experts’ judgment on location factors and European financial 
centers before, during, and after the financial crisis. Due to the time period covered, it provides 
deeper understandings of changing views regarding the general determinants relevant to 
financial intermediaries, which to a great extent depend on several external conditions. Thus, 
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the findings fill the gap of variations in the relevance of location factors, which have 
previously not been empirically analyzed and have hence been subject to speculation.  
First, the empirical evidence shows that the assessment of a financial center’s 
attractiveness varies significantly over time. An important implication of this study is that it 
appears that countries considered least attractive before the recent financial crisis (i.e., 
Germany and France) caught up during the crisis but afterward plummeted even below pre-
crisis levels. Conversely, it also appears that countries considered most attractive before the 
crisis regained or exceeded their advantage after the crisis. This applies to countries with very 
specialized financial centers and which are heavily reliant on financial exports (i.e., London, 
Luxembourg), which as such offer competitive advantages even in normal times. 
Second, the relevant location factors are persistent. The results show that the decisive 
part of the comparative advantage in a financial center lies outside the company and even 
outside its industry. The speedy information exchange within dense social networks increases 
attractiveness. In comparison, an existing specialized pool of labor without concentration 
seems not to be relevant, as the human capital factor is relatively mobile in an increasingly 
integrated Europe.  
Further, this analysis does not find that governments have lost their influence on 
competition to global forces. Support by the government strongly increases the attractiveness 
of a location; however, the advantage is due more to the regulation framework than the level 
of the tax burden. Market size can positively affect attractiveness, but is not a prerequisite.  
Third, the variation in the socio-economic background of market participants is 
negligible and cannot indicate different individual behavior. Intriguingly, fund companies tend 
to be more pessimistic about financial centers’ attractiveness than respondents from other 
sectors and their impact is the strongest among all considered sectors.  
Overall, direct policy recommendations can be drawn out of the findings, as financial 
centers do not emerge out of nowhere or overnight. The results emphasize that, in order to 
explain the emergence of financial centers in specific regions, it is nevertheless necessary to 
focus on former companies’ early decisions, and on how other companies later make 
subsequent location decisions because of the advantages of spatial proximity to the early 
arrivals. These lock-in effects very often lead to inefficiencies as they do not induce 
institutions to relocate even if another location provides more favorable conditions. The 
consequence of their relocation decision depends on the mobility level of the individual 
institution.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Regime of Location Factors 
 
 Core criterion Sub-criteria 
Market size - Size of the domestic market (e.g., economic power, employment level, purchasing power, capital market) 
Cost-related framework 
conditions 
- Costs for permissions and levy to run a business 
- Taxes (e.g., corporate taxation, taxation of highly qualified 
employees, taxation of capital income, transaction taxes) 
- Labor costs (e.g., wages, salaries, social security contributions and 
other levies) 
- Infrastructure and accessibility (e.g., airports, train connections, 
communication and information technology)  
- Costs for office real estate 
Cluster 
- Concentration of market participants (e.g., banks, insurance and 
fund companies)  
- Proximity to service providers (e.g., communication and 
information technology, business consulting, marketing, press) 
- Proximity to related institutions (e.g., stock exchanges, regulator, 
government) 
Human capital and 
knowledge 
- Specialized labor supply 
- Education level  
- Innovation potential  
- Research institutions quality of surrounding universities in 
economic and fiscal research  
Political and legal framework 
conditions 
- Regulation of the financial industry, supervisory conditions, legal 
security, bureaucracy, banking secrecy 
Positioning of prospect fields 
/ innovation - E.g. Private equity and venture capital, hedge funds 
Soft factors 
- Quality of living 
- Attractiveness of regions for high potentials  
- Multiculturalism 
- Language 
 Source: Organized by the author. 
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Source: Own illustration; the vertical solid lines (in red) illustrate the points in time of the four surveys; the vertical dashed lines (in grey) illustrate major 
economic events during the financial crisis; all stock market indices are based on 1,000 in January 2007. 
Figure 1: Survey Timeframe, main Economic Events, and Financial Indicators  
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DAX 30 (Performance Index)
MSCI Europe (Performance Index)
U.S. Fed Target Rate
ECB Main Refin. Operations
01/15/08: Citigroup 
announces record loss of 
USD 9.0 bn. for last 3 
months. 
01/21/08: “Black 
Monday,” global stock 
markets drop. 
05/01/08: Chrysler 
enters bankruptcy 
protection after 
pressure from the 
US government. 
09/08: Lehman Brothers files for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy; Merrill 
Lynch bought by Bank of America; 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under 
U.S. Gov. Conservatorship. 
02/08: Northern Rock taken 
into U.K. state ownership. 
03/08: Bear Stearns Crisis 
leading to later takeover by 
J.P. Morgan Chase. 
02/03/09: AIG reports largest 
quarterly loss in U.S. 
corporate history: USD 61.7 
bn. 
(1)                                                         (2)                                                    (3)                                                    (4) 
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Table 2: Sample Description 
 
Item asked 
 
Responses (in %) 
 
Number of 
Responses* 
Gender  
 male: 94.7 % female: 5.3 %     620 
Age (in years)  
 <40: 20.9 % 40-50: 43.8 % >50: 35.3 % mean: 47.4 612 
University Degree  
 yes: 70.7 % no: 29.3 %    618 
Professional Experience in General (in years)  
 <15: 15.7 % 15-25: 45.8 % >25: 38.5 %  mean: 24.3 618 
Professional Experience in Financial Markets (in years)  
 <15: 31.0 % 15-25: 48.4 % >25: 20.6 % mean: 20.2 620 
Industry  
 Banks: 62.5 %  Fund companies: 12.3 %   730 
 
Insurance 
companies: 7.5 % Corporates:  17.7 %   
Located in major financial center**  
  yes: 16.0 %   no: 84.0 %         
Source: Own calculations; *The number of responses is compounded as follows: 126 in 2008, 228 in 2009, 135 in 
2010 and 241 in 2011; **Zip codes beginning with 60 are assigned to Frankfurt/Main. 
 
 
Figure 2: Attractiveness of Germany as a Financial Center 
 
 
 Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure 3: General Rating of the European Financial Centers 
  
 
 Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure 4: Relevant Location Factors in Theory and Realization 
 
 
 Source: Own calculations; the scales of assessment on (a) the left-hand side and (b) the right-hand side 
range from minus 2 (a= unimportant, b= much worse) to plus 2 (a= very important, b= much better). The 
factors are sorted by importance in 2008 and thus before the financial crisis. 
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Figure 5: Assessment of Government Efforts to create Framework Conditions 
 
 
 Source: Own calculations; rating scale corresponds to school grades from 1=A (very good) to 5=F (fail). 
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Table 3: List of Independent Variables and Definitions 
  
Variable Description 
      
Assessments regarding the existing location factors (Likert scale 1-5): 
   MARKET Market size 
 
 
CONCENTRATION Close proximity between financial market participants in a cluster   
TAX Tax attractiveness (company taxation, taxation of capital, taxation of highly qualified workers)  
HUMANCAPITAL Human capital and knowledge (qualified employees, proximity to universities)  
REGULATION Attractiveness of the regulatory and supervisory framework  
 
 
STABPOL Stability of the political system (legal security, stable political guidelines)  
STABECON Stability of the economy (prices, interest rate, exchange rates, economic development)  
INNOVATION Innovation potential (positioning in future-oriented fields)  
SOFTFACTS Soft factors (living quality, language, culture,  spare time activities)               
GOVC Efforts of the government to establish favorable framework conditions  
GOVY Improvements by the government in the last two years  
      
 
Socio-economic background of the financial expert: 
  
 
AGE Age, in years  
  
 
JOBEX Duration of time working in business, in years 
 
 
FINEX Duration of time working in the field of finance, in years  
UNI Dummy variable for graduation from a university 
 
 
FINCENTER Dummy variable for locations of zip codes beginning with 60 are assigned to Frankfurt  
BANK Dummy variable for working in a bank (benchmark) 
 
 
FUNDCOMPANY Dummy variable for working in a fund company 
 
 
INSURANCE Dummy variable for working in an insurance company  
CORPORATE Dummy variable for working in a corporation (excl. banks, fund companies, and insurances) 
       Time Dummies: 
     
 
Year 2009 Dummy variable for the year 2009 
  
 
Year 2010 Dummy variable for the year 2010 
  
 
Year 2011 Dummy variable for the year 2011 
  
 
 
Source: Organized by the author.  
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  Table 4: Empirical Results with an Ordered Probit Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 coef se coef se coef se coef se 
MARKET   
0.104† (0.066) 
  
0.137** (0.067) 
CONCENTRATION   
0.211*** (0.069) 
  
0.224*** (0.070) 
TAX   
0.049 (0.073) 
  
0.047 (0.074) 
HUMANCAPITAL   
-0.051 (0.068) 
  
-0.055 (0.069) 
REGULATION   
0.101** (0.056) 
  
0.116** (0.058) 
STABPOL   
0.089 (0.076) 
  
0.109 (0.078) 
STABECON   
0.011 (0.084) 
  
-0.035 (0.086) 
INNOVATION   
0.069 (0.066) 
  
0.084 (0.067) 
SOFTFACTS   
0.091 (0.070) 
  
0.111† (0.072) 
GOVC   
0.052* (0.066) 
 
 
0.061* (0.067) 
GOVY   
0.325*** (0.083) 
 
 
0.348*** (0.085) 
AGE   
  
-0.007 (0.006) -0.002 (0.006) 
FINEX   
  
0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
JOBEX   
  
0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
UNI    
 
0.118 (0.118) 0.121 (0.121) 
FINCENTER    
 
0.155 (0.156) 0.161 (0.161) 
FUNDCOMPANY    
 
-0.675*** (0.194) -0.877*** (0.201) 
INSURANCE    
 
0.036 (0.191) -0.168 (0.201) 
CORPORATE    
 
-0.097 (0.203) -0.240 (0.212) 
Year 2009 0.239
† (0.152) 0.139 (0.156) 0.267* (0.153) 0.190† (0.157) 
Year 2010 0.1 (0.164) -0.035 (0.170) 0.094 (0.165) -0.020 (0.172) 
Year 2011 -0.331** (0.154) -0.405** (0.161) -0.323** (0.155) -0.38** (0.163) 
Number of 
observations 629 573 538 472 
Log-Likelihood -748.23 -631.86 -626.51 -523.85 
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.087 0.023 0.118 
LR Test LR(19)=111.60 [0.000] 
LR(8)=26.61 
[0.008] 
LR(11)=95.02 
[0.000]  
Source: Own calculation; P values in brackets; Standard errors (se) in parentheses; † Significance at the 15% level; * 
Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. The LR test refers to the 
comparison with the most general model (4). 
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Table 5: Marginal Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx 
MARKET -.0013914† -.0204265** -.0399842** .0479244** .0138777** 
 
(.00094) (.00875) (.01701) (.02023) (.00606) 
CONCENTRATION -.0018912† -.0277638*** -.0543466*** .0651389*** .0188626*** 
 
(.00115) (.00935) (.01807) (.0213) (.00662) 
TAX -.0000282 -.000414 -.0008103 .0009712 .0002812 
 
(.00063) (.0092) (.01801) (.02159) (.00625) 
HUMANCAPITAL .0002837 .0041648 .0081524 -.0097713 -.0028295 
 
(.00062) (.0089) (.01743) (.02088) (.00606) 
REGULATION -.0010679 -.0156774** -.0306879** .036782*** .0106512** 
 
(.00075) (.00757) (.01464) (.01748) (.0052) 
STABPOL -.0010579 -.0155308† -.0304011† .0364382† .0105516† 
 
(.00085) (.01003) (.01951) (.02326) (.0069) 
STABECON .0001941 .0028498 .0055785 -.0066862 -.0019362 
 
(.00076) (.01106) (.02164) (.02594) (.00752) 
INNOVATION -.0006989 -.0102611 -.0200858 .0240745 .0069714 
 
(.00068) (.00857) (.0167) (.01997) (.00586) 
SOFTFACTS -.0008236 -.0120914 -.0236684 .0283686 .0082148 
 
(.00078) (.00916) (.01799) (.02152) (.00626) 
GOVC -.0008764 -.0128659† -.0251845† .0301857† .008741† 
 
(.00073) (.00867) (.0169) (.02015) (.00597) 
GOVY -.0029196* -.0428624*** -.0839017*** .1005631*** .0291206*** 
 
(.00169) (.01178) (.02252) (.02639) (.00842) 
AGE .0000273 .0004004 .0007838 -.0009395 -.000272 
 
(.00006) (.00082) (.00161) (.00192) (.00056) 
FINEX -8.79e-08 -1.29e-06 -2.53e-06 3.03e-06 8.77e-07 
 
(.00000) (.00000) (.00000) (.00000) (.00000) 
JOBEX 1.35e-07 1.99e-06 3.89e-06 -4.66e-06 -1.35e-06 
 
(.00000) (.00000) (.00001) (.00001) (.00000) 
UNI .0007771 .0116667 .0237341 -.0278088 -.0083691 
 
(.00104) (.01481) (.03123) (.03575) (.01123) 
FINCENTER .0002287 .0033166 .0063629 -.0077149 -.0021932 
 
(.00148) (.02113) (.03974) (.04875) (.01361) 
FUNDCOMPANY .0217293* .1666213*** .1134404*** -.259035*** -.042756*** 
 
(.0131) (.05024) (.01952) (.05162) (.00895) 
INSURANCE .0014271 .0192803 .0330454 -.0427184 -.0110344 
 
(.00246) (.02918) (.04356) (.06098) (.01408) 
CORPORATE .0028864 .0361347 .0548865 -.0759839 -.0179237 
 
(.00356) (.03508) (.04069) (.06605) (.01288) 
Year 2009 -.0018507 -.0284073† -.0605892† .068884† .0219632 
 
(.0015) (.01841) (.04212) (.04544) (.01618) 
Year 2010 .0000363 .0005327 .00104 -.0012484 -.0003606 
 
(.00151) (.02215) (.04312) (.05184) (.01494) 
Year 2011 .0030533 .0406784* .0693592* -.0896474* -.0234435* 
  (.00254) (.02424) (.03595) (.04975) (.01232) 
 
Source: Own calculation; Standard errors in parentheses (se); † Significance at the 15% level,* Significant at the 
10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
